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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondent brought this action to recover for 
injuries sustained and damages incurred as a result of a semi 
tractor-trailer wreck occurring near Gillette, Wyoming, in 
August of 1968. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The jury returned a special verdict in favor of Plaintiff 
and against Bailey's Moving and Storage Company in the amount of 
$79,364.31 special damages and $250,000.00 general damages on the 
grounds of negligence and breach of contract. The trial court 
entered judgment in this amount even though the award of general 
damages exceeded the prayer by $50,000.00. Judgment for the same 
amount was also entered against Defendant Allied Van Lines and in 
favor of Plaintiff on the basis that Bailey's Moving and Storage 
acted as its agent. Defendant Allied Van Lines was awarded 
judgment in the amount of the Plaintiff!s award against Baileyfs 
Moving and Storage in the same amount as Plaintiff's award on its 
cross-claim. Based on the juryTs verdict, a judgment of no cause 
of action was entered in favor of Slim Olson's Service Station. 
The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendants 
American Oil and C & J Bailey. 
The motions of Defendants-Appellants Bailey's Moving and 
Storage and Allied Van Lines for new trial and judgment n.o.v. 
were denied. (Tr. 1072) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The jury's verdict and the trial court's denial of Defendants' 
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i 
motions for new trial and judgment n.o.v. should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondent does not agree with the Statement of 
Facts recited by Defendants-Appellants either as to relevancy or 
accuracy. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot agree that the statement 
contained in Defendants1 brief presents the facts in a light most 
favorable to him. Plaintiff-Respondent, therefore, presents the 
following statement of facts. 
Plaintiff was employed as a moving van operator in March, 
1967, by Defendant-Appellant Bailey's Moving and Storage Company 
(Baileys), a local moving company which acts as agent for Defendant-
Appellant Allied Van Lines (Allied), a nation-wide moving firm. 
Plaintiff purchased a new tractor and Baileys owned and 
furnished a new trailer with which Plaintiff was to haul house-
hold goods for Baileys and Allied Van Lines. Baileys assumed 
responsibility for major repairs of the trailer. (Plfs. Exh. 29) 
Plaintiff was told that he would be required to pay for those 
maintenance repairs costing less than fifty dollars. (Tr. 490; 
Abst. 61) Defendants undertook to perform monthly maintenance 
and inspections of the tractor and trailer. 
In the fall of 1967 Plaintiff noticed a rattle that could 
be heard coming from the rear end of the trailer. He also 
observed that the trailer tires were wearing unevenly. These 
problems were pointed out to Gilbert Wilburn, an employee of 
Baileys, who was authorized by Allied Van Lines to conduct 
Allied's required 30-day inspections. (Abst. 20; Tr. 145-146) 
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Mr. Wilburn, however, did not find anything significantly wrong 
with the trailer. (Abst. 20) Plaintiff replaced the tires on 
the trailer due to the unusual wear. (Abst. 20; Tr. 146) 
Subsequently, while Plaintiff was awaiting loading instructions 
in Sacramento, California, another truck driver told Plaintiff 
that the rear suspension on the trailer was loose. (Abst. 20; 
Tr. 147) Plaintiff checked one of the torsion bars on the trailer 
and found it to be ftreal sloppy." (Tr. 147; Abst. 20) Plaintiff 
called the manager at Bailey's Moving and Storage for instructions 
regarding the suspension problem. He was told he should load the 
trailer and drive back to Salt Lake and that a repair or check 
would be made. Upon arriving at Baileys, Plaintiff was told by 
the manager to take the trailer to a local trailer repair garage, 
Utility Trailer, and see what the problem was. (Abst. 20-21) 
The shop foreman at Utility Trailer, Lee Wareham, testified 
that he prepared an estimate to repair the suspension system of 
the trailer that would in his opinion make it roadworthy. (Abst. 
7; Tr. 59-60) The estimate was for a little over $600,00. (Abst. 
8; Tr. 61) He stated that the wear shown by the torsion bars and 
the four bushings that fit around the bars would cause the trailer 
to run out of line and make it hard to handle. (Abst. 8; Tr. 60) 
The repair was never authorized and he did not see the trailer 
again until it was purchased by Utility Trailers as salvage. 
(Abst. 3; Tr. 61) (An illustration of the suspension system parts 
is included herein at Appendix fAf.) 
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( 
Plaintiff testified that Bailey's manager, Bob Linnell, 
refused to authorize the repair because it would take four days 
for the repair to be completed. (Abst. 21; Tr. 150) Plaintiff 
testified that Mr. Linnell asked him if he knew someone else who 
could look at the trailer and he said that Slim Olson's had done 
some work for him, and Mr. Linnell instructed him to take it 
there. (Abst. 21; Tr. 151) At Slim Olson's Service Station he 
was told that a temporary repair could be made by shimming the 
bars. The mechanic testified that the front torsion bar was 
tightened by inserting two one-eight inch shims on two of the four 
sides of the holding clamp. Both sides of the front bar would 
have been tightened in this manner. He said that no work was 
done on the rear torsion bar because he would have had to pull 
the wheels off the trailer in order to work on it. (Abst. 72; 
Tr. 586) Later, when Plaintiff picked the trailer up he noticed 
that the rattle was still evident, but was significantly less. 
(Abst. 27; Tr. 192-193) Slim Olson's work invoice was dated May 22, 
1968. (Defs. Exh. 49) 
On August 2, 1968, Plaintiff and his two sons left with the 
tractor-trailer for Minot, South Dakota. (Abst. 22) The tractor-
trailer had been inspected the day before at Bailey's by Gilbert 
Wilburn. (Defs. Exh. 24) After spending the night in the truck 
which had a sleeper, they arrived in Gasper, Wyoming, where 
Plaintiff was to pick up two computers from the Allied agent 
there. (Tr. 165; Abst. 22) They left Casper approximately 1:00 
p.m. on Saturday, August 3rd, and began driving toward Minot 
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where they were to unload on Monday. About 40 to 50 miles out of 
Casper they stopped at Midwest City for cokes and hamburgers. 
(Tr. 166-167; Abst. 22) Upon leaving Midwest the truck had 
traveled approximately 12 miles to Gillette, Wyoming, when the 
tractor and trailer left the road and overturned, severely 
injuring Plaintiff-Respondent. 
Plaintiff testified that his first sensation was that the 
trailer had been rear-ended by a car. He was thrown forward in 
his seat and the truck jerked off to the right side of the road. 
(Tr. 168; Abst. 23) Upon checking the trailer in the rear-view 
mirror, he saw it was in a jack-knife position behind him. (Tr. 
170; Abst. 23) The paved portion of the highway is approximately 
22 feet wide at this point and the shoulders of the road are 
quite steep. (Plfs. Exh. 12; Abst. 4) Plaintiff let up on the 
gas and attempted to steer the rig back onto the highway. The 
truck came onto the highway, but continued across the pavement 
and over the embankment on the left side of the road. (Abst 23; 
Tr. 168-169) 
Clifton Ritchie of the Wyoming Highway Patrol was the police 
officer called to the scene. He testified that there were quite 
a large number of people around the immediate area when he arrived 
and that the Plaintiff driver was lying on the ground covered 
with blankets and coats. The two boys were sitting on the ground 
next to him. The Plaintiff driver appeared to be in so much pain 
that he did not pursue a conversation with him. (Tr. 14; Abst. 2) 
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The two boys were shook up, emotional and concerned about 
their father. (Abst. 2; Tr. 15) Officer Ritchie recorded in his 
accident report that: 
The two boys that were riding with their father stated 
that they were all three talking at the time of the acci-
dent; and they heard a loud, sharp, banging noise from the 
rear of the tractor or trailer and then their Dad started to 
fight the steering wheel to control the tractor. (Defs. Exh. 
14, page 3) 
Kendall Dewsnup, the younger boy in the truck, testified 
that just prior to the wreck he was between his dad and his 
brother sitting on what is referred to as the "doghouse." (Tr. 
100) He liked to sit there because he could watch the gauges. 
(Tr. 100) He said the truck had been going about 45 miles per 
hour. (Abst. 102) The first thing that he observed was a loud 
bang behind them that made the sound that one car makes when it 
runs into another. (Tr. 100-101) There was a screeching of tires 
and the truck veered right. His dad tried to get control, but 
the truck pulled back on the road but went off the other side, 
still screeching. (Abst. 13; Tr. 101) 
The first thing he remembered was seeing his father bloody 
and in a lot of pain; his brother was up on the highway trying to 
flag down a car. (Tr. 102) He remembers riding in the ambulance 
with his father and his father being semi-concious and mumbling 
about "turn me over--I can't stand to lay on my back.n (Tr. 104) 
The other boy, Alan, testified that he had been sitting in 
the seat opposite his father. He could see the right edge of the 
asphalt road and estimated it to have been approximately two feet 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 7 -
from the front wheel of the tractor. He remembers a pronounced 
explosion coming from the rear and a sudden jerk. The truck 
leaned his direction, then "caught" and went off the left side of 
the road. There was also a rattling sound like something was 
dragging as the rig went back across the road. (Abst 15; Tr. 113) 
In addition to preparing a diagram of the scene, (Defs. Exh. 
14, page 4) the officer took pictures and inspected the vehicle. 
He testified upon inspecting the vehicle that he observed no 
evidence of a blown tire, nor any indication of a steering or 
brake defect. With respect to the suspension of the trailer, 
however, he did observe a break in the suspension system of the 
trailer at a point that appeared to him to be a rear spring 
shackle. (Abst. 4; Tr. 24) He identified the area on a diagram 
of the trailer's suspension system. (Tr. 24-25 and Plfs. Exh. 13) 
On the accident report he checked the category of "Vehicle 
Defects—Other Defects." (Defs. Exh. 14, page 2) He also noted 
that the rear set of duals on the trailer were canted to one 
side. (Abst. 5-6; Tr. 44) The officer also testified that he had 
a conversation at the scene with the wrecker operator, George 
Mason. Mr. Mason told him that the rear axle would have to be 
chained ahead before they uprighted the trailer. (Abst. 7; Tr. 
135) 
Defendants' witness, Marvin Shandies, testified that the 
axles of the trailer are held in place by the frame brackets, 
torsion bars and bushings. He said that one expects bushings to 
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wear with use. Worn bushings, he said, permit the torsion bar to 
move with a resulting clicking or clanging noise accompanied by-
unusual tire wear. (Abst. 50; Tr. 320-321) He said that a loose 
torsion bar will wear the bolt that positions the torsion bar 
laterally. (Tr. 344) A loose torsion bar would allow the axles 
to misalign somewhat causing the rear end of the trailer to kick 
out to one side or dog track as the rig is going straight down 
the road. (Tr. 321; Abst. 51) He stated that in conducting an 
inspection, wear of the bushings and torsion bar would be indicated 
by looseness of the bar and wear of the positioning bolt. (Tr. 
345; Abst. 55) In the case of a worn bar and bushings, he would 
replace them. He added that the manufacturer makes a kit for 
that purpose. (Tr. 348) He further stated that as a truck driver 
he would accept shimming of a loose bar only as a temporary 
repair to get him where he was going. (Abst. 55; Tr. 349) 
Mr. Shandies said the photographs showed misalignment of the 
axles and that with a broken frame bracket you would have mis-
alignment of the axles. (Tr. 303) Mr. Shandies said that if the 
frame bracket broke, he would expect one side of the axle to move 
back, causing the tire and wheel to hit a member which supports 
the mud flap. He would expect the damage to be visible in the 
photographs. (Tr. 310) Mr. Shandies stated that the photographs 
showed apparent damage to the left rear mud flap bracket and the 
tire carrier. (Abst. 56; Tr. 361) 
Mr. Shandies said that if he were to tow a trailer that had 
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a torsion bar out of place, he would either put the bar back in 
place or substitute something like a large bolt. (Abst. 56; Tr. 
354) 
Lee Wareham, the day shift foreman at Utility who had prepared 
the repair estimate when Mr. Dewsnup brought it in, recalls that 
when the wrecked trailer was brought into the yard one axle was 
chained forward to make the trailer towable. (Abst. 8; Tr. 62) 
With respect to the trailer's suspension system, he testified 
that one of the frame brackets had broken loose from the frame. 
(Abst. 8; Tr. 62-63) He identified this frame bracket on a 
diagram of the suspension system of the trailer. (Abst. 8; Plfs. 
Exh. 18) 
Arnie Schmidt testified that he was employed as night shift 
shop foreman by Utility Trailer at the time the trailer was 
brought into the yard at Utility. He testified that one of the 
torsion bars was not in place at that time. (Abst. 58; Tr. 445) 
He said that he observed that the positioning bolt that holds the 
torsion bar in place had worn out where it fits into the posi-
tioning slot on the torsion bar. He said that the U bolts that 
hold the equalizing beams to the axle were twisted and he replaced 
them. (Abst. 58; Tr. 449) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VERDICT 
A. THERE EXISTS A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF THE VALIDITY OF 
THE VERDICT. 
The jury answered a special verdict finding that the cause 
of the accident was a defect in the trailer; that Baileys was 
negligent; that said negligence was a proximate cause of the 
accident; that Baileys breached its contract to maintain the 
trailer; and, said breach was a proximate cause of the accident. 
On the other hand, the jury found that Defendant Slim Olson's 
Service Station, who had repaired the trailer, was not negligent. 
The fact that the jury made this distinction indicates that the 
jury acted out of discernment and not passion. 
Moreover, Defendants-Appellantsf post-trial motions for a 
new trial and judgment n.o.v. raising the issue of whether the 
evidence was sufficient to support the verdict were considered 
and denied. The Defendants ordered a transcript of the testimony 
of the Plaintiff's expert witness and this transcript was avail-
able for the trial court's consideration and for the preparation 
of their argument to the court. The motions were argued to the 
court and the matter taken under advisement on November 6, 1975, 
and subsequently denied on December 8, 1975. (R. 1070 and 1071) 
The fact that the trial court denied Defendantsf motions after 
hearing the evidence and reviewing the transcript places an 
additional stamp of approval on the verdict. EFCO Distrib. Co., 
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v. Perrin, 17 U. 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615, 618 (1966); Lemmor v. 
Denver 6c R.G.W. R. Co. , 9 U.2d 195, 204, 341 P.2d 215 (1959) 
Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 U.2d 362, 267 P.2d 759 (1952) 
B. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VERDICT EVEN IF THE TESTIMONY 
CHALLENGED BY APPELLANTS IS NOT CONSIDERED. 
The evidence was uncontroverted that the suspension system 
of the trailer needed major repairs in May, but that Defendant 
Baileys refused to authorize anything but a makeshift repair; a 
repair that even according to Defendants' expert witness should 
only be used until the truck can be brought in off the road and 
repaired. (Abst. 55) Thereafter, the trailer was towed approxi-
mately 12,000 miles without any further repairs being made or 
authorized on the suspension system before the wreck occurred in 
August. (Abst. 27; 197-198) 
The wreck occurred just after the rig had topped a little 
rise in the road. (Abst. 13) The three occupants of the cab were 
talking when they heard a loud bang from the rear and the rig 
immediately swerved. (Defs. Exh. 14, page 3) Attempts by 
Plaintiff to regain control were unsuccessful. The investigating 
officer inspected the vehicle for defects and observed a broken 
part that he identified as a spring shackle on the rear of the 
trailer. (Abst. 4) On page two of his accident report the officer 
noted a vehicle defect. (Defs. Exh. 14) This "spring shackle'1 was 
identified by the foreman at Utility Trailer as being a frame 
bracket of the suspension system, one of which was broken when he 
saw the trailer after the wreck. (Abst. 3) (Compare Plfs. Exh 13 
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with Plfs. Exh. 18) 
The night shift foreman at Utility Trailer, Mr. Schmidt, 
testified that when the trailer was brought into Utility's yard 
after the wreck, the torsion bar was out of place. Mr. Schmidt 
said that part of the positioning bolt that is designed to hold 
the torsion bar in place was worn out. (Abst. 58; Tr. 446) 
Defendants1 witness, Mr. Shandies, testified that if a rear 
frame bracket had broken on one side prior to the wreck, he would 
expect the axle, wheel and tire on that side to move back causing 
damage to the mud flap carrier bracket and possibly the tire 
carrier. The photographs show the left rear mud flap bracket 
bent out of position. (Abst. 56 and Plfs. Exh. 5) 
Testimony of persons having no interest in the action estab-
lished all of the above evidence, except the account of the 
events that transpired during the wreck. Moreover, the account 
of the events transpiring during the wreck itself is highly 
reliable since it was obtained by the investigating police officer 
from the two young boys who had had no opportunity (nor reason at 
that time) to collaborate with their father or fabricate a story. 
The boys! account of the accident was recorded in the officer's 
police report shortly after the wreck itself. (Defs. Exh. 18) 
In order for the Defendants-Appellants to prevail on their 
appeal, they must show that the jury could not have reasonably 
found as it did. In re Hubbard, 30 Utah 2d 260, 516 P.2d 741 
(1973) The undisputed evidence was that a broken frame bracket 
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would cause the respective axle to go out of alignment thereby 
allowing the trailer to steer the rig. The evidence is equally 
clear that the bracket was broken. Plaintiff is entitled to 
recover, therefore, if the jury could reasonably find that the 
bracket broke before, and not as a result of, the wreck. 
The implausibility of the frame bracket having been broken 
in the wreck is demonstrated by the lack of damage to the rear of 
the trailer as shown in the photographs of the wreck and the 
following testimony given by Plaintiff's expert witness, Mr. 
Wildey: 
Q. (By Mr. Wadsworth) And actually, with a violent impact 
like this that we have been talking about, that bracket 
could have sheared off in that violent impact? 
A. I would like to just draw --
Q. Let me just ask you if that is also a good possibility. 
A. Well, it is a remote possibility because with a violent 
impact, first of all most of the energy of the impact is 
destroyed, is destroyed in the damage to the trailer's left 
side. Now, in an accident you have to destroy energy, and 
usually this is why on automobiles today you have energy-
absorbing bumpers. You let the bumper absorb the energy, 
and you walk out of the car. This is the same thing here. 
You see the trailer turned over on its side, and a lot of 
energy has been destroyed in deforming the trailer. So by 
the time the energy hits the running gear or the suspension, 
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a lot of it has been destroyed. (Tr. 270) 
While it is possible that the jury may have chosen to 
believe that the frame bracket broke as a result of the wreck, it 
was not probable that this heavy piece of metal (Defs. Exh. 20) 
would have been torn loose from the frame as a result of the 
wreck without there having been considerably more accompanying 
damage to the undercarriage of the trailer. 
Considering the obviously defective condition of the trailer's 
suspension, the fact that the left rear mud flap carrier bracket was 
bent out of position as illustrated by the photographs, as 
Defendants' expert witness said it would have been if the break 
occurred before the wreck, and the account related by the truck 
occupants, the jury could be expected to draw the correct in-
ferences from the facts and find that the wreck was caused by a 
broken frame bracket. Day v. Smith, 17 U.2d 221, 403 P.2d 186,(1965); 
Hewett v. GenTl Tire and Rub. Co., 3 U.2d 354, 284 P.2d 471 (1955) 
C. THE OPINION TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS SUPPORTS 
THE VERDICT AND MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 56 OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
George Wildey, a product safety engineer with the Terex 
division of General Motors and an expert in failure mode analysis, 
testified that he had inspected the actual trailer after it had 
been repaired, that he had been in court and heard the testimony 
presented, that he had examined the photographs of the wreck, 
that he was familiar with the trailer's suspension system, and 
that his knowledge of the trailer's suspension included its 
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evaluation, testing, and design, and that based thereon he had 
an opinion as to the cause of the wreck. (Abst. 31-32; Tr. 226-
229) 
Mr. Wildey testified that the wreck was the effect of ground 
induced steering by the trailer which took charge of the tractor, 
forcing it off the road. He stated that the ground induced 
steering arose from misalignment of the trailer axles so that in 
effect they tended to turn in a radius instead of following the 
tractor. (Abst. 32; Tr. 232, See Plfs. Exh. 54) 
Mr. Wildey explained the function of the components of the 
trailer's suspension system including the air bags, frame brackets, 
torsion bar, equalizer beams, and bushings. (Abst. 32-33; Tr. 
233) (Appendix A hereto contains an illustration of the component 
parts of one of the two identical assemblies.) While the bar is supported 
on each end by a frame bracket, bushing, and equalizing beam, he 
explained that there was a notch in the torsion bar through which 
a portion of a positioning bolt fits in order to prevent the 
torsion bar from moving laterally, that is, to the left or right 
of the trailer. Mr. Wildey had made a model of the torsion bar-
bushing-equalizer beam-frame bracket assembly, and using this 
model he demonstrated that wear of the torsion bar, bushings and 
forks at the end of the equalizer beams would allow the torsion 
bar to move somewhat thereby accelerating wear of the positioning 
bolt. (Abst. 33; Tr. 241-242) (Plfs. Exh. 20) With enough wear, 
the bolt would no longer be capable of keeping the torsion bar 
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from moving out one side of the bracket. (Tr. 242) He further 
demonstrated what would happen if the torsion bar were to move 
laterally far enough that it would no longer be properly secured 
on one side. (Tr. 242) He explained that the load being drawn by 
that side would pivot somewhat due to the looseness thereby over-
stressing the opposite frame bracket that holds the axle in place 
as well as the torsion bar. (Abst. 34; Tr. 242-245) He explained 
that this result did not require the torsion bar to come 
completely out of the assembly on one side. Using the model he 
illustrated how the bar could move far enough to drop one spacing 
washer, allowing twisting to occur, breaking the frame bracket. 
This would allow the side of the axle where the bracket had broken 
to drop back causing misalignment of the trailer axles, with 
ground induced steering the result. (Tr. 245-246) The trailer 
would then take charge of the tractor and force it off the road. 
Defendants-Appellants, however, contend that the expert 
testimony of Mr. Wildey to the effect that ground induced steering 
by the trailer axles forced the tractor off the road is based on 
speculation. This contention is based on three assumptions: 
(1) Wildey based his opinion solely on the photographs; 
(2) The photographs do not support the opinion; 
(3) The opinion requires an earlier appearance of scuff 
marks on the road. 
Each of these conclusions is erroneous. First, the witness 
did not base his opinion solely on the photographs. He did 
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state, however, that the photographs tended to support his 
opinion. 
Q. (By Mr. Peck) Mr. Wildey, are you able to find any 
evidence of this having occurred from the photographs? 
A. When we look at the photographs and perhaps lay a couple 
of rulers across the axles, we do see that there is some --
"k *k •& 
A. I should point out that this is the axle here that we 
are talking about. If we put our ruler on this axle and put 
another one on this axle here, we can see that there is some 
misalignment. 
J~ J- JL 
*\ /> /v 
A. Which would tend to bear out our theory that we got some 
ground-induced steering which was caused by defective fit in 
the brackets which led to this occurrence. (Tr. 246-247) 
-k -k *fr 
Q. (By Mr. Wadsworth) Now--well, are you just now deciding 
whether it is the front or rear one that it will show? 
A. No, I have looked at these photographs and puzzled over 
them for quite a time, and it seemed that the photographs 
bore me out that it would probably be the rear assembly. 
(Tr. 251) 
Although Defendants1 counsels chose to cross-examine pri-
marily about the photographs, other areas were raised on cross-
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examination which demonstrates that the witness did not rely 
exclusively on the photographs. For example, during the cross-
examination of Mr. Wildey regarding the type of break observed by 
the investigating officer, the following testimony was presented: 
Q. (By Mr. Wadsworth) And this was a sudden shock type 
break, and you are telling me that this shock type break 
occurred before the accident happened and thatfs what caused 
the accident to happen; but, in fact, because itfs a shock 
type break and not a fatigue type break, it happened all at 
once, didnf t it? 
A. Well, there was some shock in the initial phase of the 
accident. 
Q. Well, there was no shock involved until the truck goes 
off the road, was there? 
A. No. I would think there was some shock from the evidence 
of hearing some loud noise at the rear plus the fact that --
Q. Now we are getting to this --
A. -- Trailer took charge. 
Q. I see where we are getting to this bang theory now. 
What does this loud bang mean to you? 
A. A bang usually indicates something is breaking or broken. 
(Tr. 254) (emphasis added) 
In questioning Mr. Wildey about whether the torsion bar drifted 
out of position the following testimony was presented on cross-
examination: 
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Q. (By Mr, Wadsworth) Now, would you expect, Mr. Wildey, 
that if you had that drifting out, that you would get a 
rather violent action of the axles twisting? 
A. Yes. I think this accounts for the witnesses1 description 
of the accident. (Tr. 272) (emphasis added) 
In forming his opinion, Mr. Wildey also considered the type of 
temporary repair or shimming of the torsion bar that had been 
performed at Slim Olson's Service Station. In discussing the 
shimming process and drawing a diagram (Plfs. Exh. 55) to illus-
trate his testimony, the following testimony was presented: 
* * * 
Now, any shim which is going to be driven in has got to be a 
minimum thickness, say an eighth. You can't drive in a 
piece of sixteenth steel, or else you are going to bend it. 
An eighth times four is half an inch. So if we look at two 
shims, then the bar was certain to be rounded, and we assume 
the corners are pretty well worn off of it. Then we are 
looking at a situation where the clamp comes around like 
this. The arm disappears out where it is locating to the 
axles. You can see that if shims of this nature were to be 
put in, it was pretty severe wear, because if we tilt the 
bar . . . 
* * -k 
We can see there is quite a bit on angularity, which can 
accelerate the . . . wear to a point where you are getting 
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some instability in the whole support of the axle. (Tr. 236) 
Defendants-Appellants, however, contend that Mr. Wildey 
relied solely on the photographs. It is true that he stated that 
he could not be more firm in his opinion of which side gave way 
unless the actual parts were available. He stated, however, that 
based to some extent on the photographs, he thought that it was 
the left rear frame bracket that broke. (Tr. 248-249) 
It was in this regard, i.e. , "which side gave way'1 and not 
,!what gave way11 or "what caused the wreck," that the witness made 
the statements that Defendants-Appellants argue establish that 
the witness relied solely on the photographs to support his 
opinion. This can be illustrated by the following testimony, part 
of which has been quoted by Defendants-Appellants in their brief: 
Q. Well, letfs see if it is Mr. Wildey. Now, you are 
saying that this bar came out of the right rear fork? 
A. Yes. Those are the indications. 
Q. Now, what are you contending that that did when it came 
out of the right rear fork? 
A. I am contending that it allowed the axle to swing from 
the opposite point by what would be a somewhat loose assembly. 
Q. Okay. Well, you are contending that this then put some 
added tension on one of the frame brackets. 
A. No. That bracket by then, if itfs sitting out in the 
open, that is the bracket which is having the whole draft 
load transferred to it. 
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Q. Okay. So if it came out of the right --
A. It transfers to the opposite side for the bracket prob-
lem -- . • 
MR. PECK: Your Honor, I think there is some confusion 
in the minds of the jury at this point when Mr. Wadsworth 
asked the question about the right, he points to the left 
with his foot, and I wonder if we could have that clarified. 
Q. (By Mr. Wadsworth) We should start that over again. 
This is the right one over here, is it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you are contending then that the bar drifted this 
way out of these forks? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you are contending that when it drifted out, it 
put tension on which frame bracket? 
A. It would transfer to the opposite frame bracket. 
To the left frame bracket? . 
Yes. 
The left rear frame bracket? 
Well, it could have been the left front or the left 
rear, but may I look at the --
Q. This is only connected to the left rear. 
A. May I look at the photograph again? I think we could 
deduce something. It would be the rear axle which is showing 
the malalignment with the front axle because the front axle 
is pretty well lined up with the stringers under the frame 
Q 
A 
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of the trailer. 
Q. Now -- well, are you just now deciding whether it is the 
front or the rear one that it will show? 
A. No. I have looked at these photographs and puzzled over 
them for quite a time, and it seemed that the photographs 
bore me out that it would probably be the rear assembly. 
Q. All right. So you are contending that it came out of 
the right rear. Is that right? The rod came out of the 
right rear, the torsion bar came out of the right rear, 
transferring the load to the left frame bracket, the left 
rear frame bracket? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that then the added strain broke the left rear frame 
bracket from the — 
A. That would be a very strong possibility. I'm not ruling 
out that it could have worked vice versa. 
Q. Well, you must have an opinion as to how it did work if 
it is up to a reasonable probability. 
A. Yes. 
Q. If it is one or the other, it seems to me it is a possi-
bility. 
A. It is reasonable that it drifted out from the right 
side. 
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Q. Well, is that the testimony that you want to say is the 
basis of your opinion? 
A. Yes. Yes. (Tr. 250-252) 
Since the context of the questioning reveals that the topic was 
only which side broke, and not what caused the wreck, Defendants-
Appellants1 contention that the witness relied only on the photo-
graphs is erroneous. Although Defendants-Appellants attempt to 
make a major point of this question, the expert witness stated, 
however, that it was not material which side actually broke since 
the result would have been the same. (Abst. 35; Tr. 249) 
Second, Defendants-Appellants contend that Mr. Wildey .. 
acknowledged that he must make assumptions not demonstrated by 
the photographs and that this discredited his opinion as to the 
cause of the wreck. 
The police officer and the mechanic observed that after the 
wreck one of the trailer's frame brackets was broken. (Abst. 4; 
Tr. 24-25 and Abst. 8; Tr. 62-63) Mr. Wildey based his opinion 
upon this testimony in concluding that one of the brackets broke 
allowing the axles to go out of alignment. Yet the fact that a 
bracket was broken cannot be observed in the photographs. Thus, 
Mr. Wildey legitimately made ffan assumption not demonstrated in 
the photographs/1 (Appellants1 Brief at 14) (This fact further 
refutes Appellants' position that he relied solely on the photo-
graphs. ) Appellants' Complaint relates to the position of the torsion bar. 
Mr. Wildey explained that if the torsion bar were to 
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come out or part way out of its bracket, the resulting stress on 
the opposite frame bracket could cause it to break and misalign-
ment of the axles would result. (Abst. 34) By comparing the 
front torsion bar as shown in the photographs he also demonstrated 
that the rear torsion bar was not in its proper position. 
A. Now, you can see that torsion bar is somewhat out of 
line with the axle. Normally this is a parallel torsion bar 
with the axle. 
Q. The torsion bar is in place? 
A. It's not really, It's not parallel to the axle. 
•k -k * 
A. I was explaining that this is the axle, the shock ab-
sorbers attached to it. The torsion bar is out of parallel 
with this axle, whereas if we look at the leading axle, we 
see the axle and the torsion bar reasonably parallel to the 
rest of the stringers under the body, which would lead us to 
believe that this axle is okay, this axle is not. (Tr. 267-
268) 
With respect to the end of the torsion bar and whether it 
was in the assembly that would ordinarily hold it in place, Mr. 
Wildey stated: 
A. It looks as though it is still in place. That could 
happen as soon as the trailer tipped on the side, and it 
could have dropped back if it had been coming out from the 
top end, and it could have dropped. 
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Q. Now we are going to have it drop back through the holes. 
Right? 
A. Not necessarily. You can't tell whether it's in the 
hole. (Tr. 255) (emphasis added) 
With respect to the location of the end of the torsion bars. Mr. 
Wildey stated that lf[t]here is no conslusive evidence in the 
photographs." (Tr. 274) 
From Respondent's point of view, however, it is significant 
that the jury did not have to find that the torsion bar completely 
left the bracket. (Abst. 34; Tr. 245) Using the model, Mr. 
Wildey described how the bar would have to move only part way 
laterally out of the assembly in order to break the frame bracket: 
A. In my opinion it could come partly out to the point 
where one side only was secured to the bracket, giving only 
one shear plane. Now, normally the integrity of this whole 
assembly depends on two shear planes, and the shear planes 
can be represented by the washers that are put in. The 
purpose of the washers is just to prevent scuffing between 
faces, this face against this face and this face against 
this face. 
Q. (By Mr. Peck) So the washers are kind of what we call --
A. Wear plates. And if one washer dropped and we got one 
shear point only on here, then I would expect we would get a 
similar result because this thing would still be allowed to 
drift because this one washer has disappeared, so then we 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 26 -
have got some play inherent with that washer dropping out, 
which would enable this to twist. 
Q. What would the result of that twisting be? 
A. We would have the same result as I have just described. 
We would have some ground-induced steering, which would let 
the trailer take charge of the tractor, and in that space of 
time we have an accident. 
Q. Mr. Wildey, could we illustrate that with this hanger 
bracket here? Which part are we talking about that is doing 
the twisting? What kind of movement are we talking about? 
A. Well, if we just twist this in here, we can see that 
that is the kind of angle to the axle by virtue of the fact 
that this is pivoting from the opposite corner. (Tr. 245-246) 
The fact that the photographs do not conclusively show the rear 
torsion bar sticking out one side, therefore, does nothing to 
disprove Respondents1 version of the wreck. 
Defendants-Appellants also complain that under Mr. Wildeyfs 
explanation of the wreck, scuff marks would have appeared sooner 
on the roadway than the officer's diagram showed. Mr. Wildey 
testified on this point on cross examination put by counsel for 
Slim Olsonfs Service Station: 
A. Let me explain, at the point of the origin of going off 
the highway, there's a dropoff from the road of some four 
or five feet, and there is a lot of weight transferred to 
the right-hand side of the trailer, which would substantially 
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unload the tires that are on the—still on the highway. 
Q. (By Mr. Nebeker) But actually if they were still on the 
highway and they were at an angle, you would expect some 
skid marks to be left there. 
A. It would be very difficult to state with any certainty. 
It would depend on the list of the trailer as it dropped off 
on the right-hand side. (Tr. 272-273) 
Counsel for Defendant Baileys also asked Mr. Wildey questions 
on this point: 
Q. (By Mr. Wadsworth) The center of gravity in these 
trailers is very low isn't it. 
A. It is reasonably low by virtue of the low load type 
tires. 
Q. And when you have that situation, less weight is going 
to shift to the right wheels than if you had a higher center 
of gravity, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But, of course, there is going to be some shift? 
A. There is going to be some shift. 
Q. But you don't know how much there is? 
A. No, because there is a dynamic shift as well as a static 
shift. By that I mean the speed that the vehicle is going 
and the rate it goes off the highway determines what kind of 
load transfers from the left to the right. 
Q. Well, you really wouldn't suspect that if both wheels 
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were holding 50 percent of the load prior to the time that 
it went off, that anything more than 20 or 25 percent more 
is going to be shifted to the right, would you? 
A. That is extremely difficult to tell in a dynamic situation. 
Q. But you wouldn't really expect more than that, would 
you? 
A. I wouldn't like to put a figure on it. I would assume 
that this would be pretty near a tip-over condition because 
of its speed. 
Q. But, in any event, there is still going to be one or two 
thousand pounds of weight: at least on the left tire, arenft 
there? 
A. Yes, which is nothing to that high-capacity tire. 
Q. And any tire that skids on the highway, even these small 
ones that weigh a thousand, two thousand pounds, if they 
skid their tires on the roadway, they leave a skid mark, 
donf t they? 
A. It is a different situation than an automobile. It has 
a very low load center. The center of gravity is almost 
between the axles. 
-k i< Vc 
Q. Well, I am saying that with an automobile you are going 
to leave some skid marks? 
A. Yes, because of its extremely low center of gravity. 
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Q. And you are not telling me that there wasn't -- enough 
of that weight wasn't transferred to the right wheels that 
there still wasn't several thousand pounds on that left set 
of wheels that would have caused a skid mark if they had 
been out of line? 
A. Possibly, but not enough to mark the highway. (Tr.233-
284) 
The jury had also heard the testimony of Sergeant Ritchie 
and had available the picture of the scene taken by him describing 
and showing the asphalt patch in the area where the rig first 
left the road. (Abst. 4; Tr.22; Plf. Exhs. 8 and 11) The jury 
was entitled to draw the reasonable inference that it would have 
been difficult for visible scuff marks to appear on this surface. 
On the other hand, when the tractor and trailer came back up from 
the right shoulder onto the highway properly and proceeded across 
the prior to impacting and turning over on the left side of the 
road, it was undisputed that scuff marks were left by the trailer 
wheels on the left side -- the side that Mr. Wildey testified 
that most likely gave way. (Abst. 41; Tr. 277, Plfs. Exh. 9) 
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POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING SERGEANT RITCHIE 
TO TESTIFY AS TO WITNESS MASON'S STATEMENT 
The investigating officer, Sergeant Ritchie testified that 
the wrecker operator, George Mason, had told him that he would 
have to chain the one trailer axle ahead. This testimony was 
admissible under Evidence ilule 63(1). This statement was incon-
sistent with his testimony at trial by deposition. Specifically, 
he was asked "And when you towed it in, did you have to do anything 
to the rear wheels of the trailer to make them tow properly?" Mr. 
Mason responded that he could not remember. Defendants-Appellants 
contend before the statement was admissible Mason must have been 
asked at his deposition the specific question of whether he had 
to chain the rear axle ahead on the trailer so that it would tow 
properly. In support of their position Defendants-Appellants 
rely upon Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P.2d 708 (1936). 
This case is not controlling. 
In Jensen one witness was asked if he had not observed a wire; 
the other was asked if he had not said that he did not remember 
anything about a fence. 89 Utah at 355. The Utah Supreme Court 
in Jensen sustained the lower court's ruling that this question 
was not specific enough to impeach on the question of the location 
of the fence. In the instant case however, Mason was asked 
specifically about the matter at issue, i.e., whether he had to 
do anything to the rear wheels of the trailer to tow it back to 
town. 
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Moreover, because the statement was made at the accident 
scene while Mason and Ritchie were looking at the rear of the 
trailer, the statement would have been admissible under Evidence 
Rule 63(4)(a) as a statement "made while the declarant was per-
ceiving the event or condition which the statement narrates, 
describes or explains . . ." 
In any case the testimony was not prejudicial because 
witness Wareham collaborated the fact that an exle had been 
chained forward by testifying that the axle had been chained in 
place when he saw it brought to Utility Trailer after the wreck. 
(Abst. 9) 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY ADMITTING THE TWO TIRES 
INTO EVIDENCE 
A. THE TIRES ILLUSTRATE THE EFFECT OF "WHEEL-HOP" A CONDITION 
INDICATIVE OF A LOOSE TORSION BAR. 
At trial the court admitted into evidence two tires that had 
been removed from the trailer several months before the wreck 
occurred. These tires illustrated to the jury the "cupping" 
effect that would result from a loose torsion bar. This was 
explained by Appellants1 witness, Mr. Shandies, as follows: 
The torsion bar may loosen up a little bit, and you start to 
get sloppiness in there . . . you will get a slight mis-
alignment . . . then your axles will shift slightly to one 
sicie or the other, depending which has more wear, and you 
will then start to get erosion of the tires . . . " (Tr. 320; 
Abst. 50) 
This tire was also described by Plaintiff's witness, Mr. 
Wildey: 
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11
. . . [I]f the bar is not securely fixed to the equalizing 
beams, you are going to get wheel hop, and this is exactly 
what we have seen in these tires. (Exhs. 22 and 23) (Tr. 
237; Abst 33) 
The tires were, therefore, demonstrative of that unusual type of 
tire wear associated with a loose torsion bar. 
B. THE TIRES WERE PROBATIVE AS TO APPELLANTS1 NEGLIGENCE IN 
FAILING TO PROPERLY MAINTAIN THE TRAILER. 
Even though the tires showed unusual wear and had to be 
replaced by Plaintiff and the tire wear was indicative of a loose 
torsion bar, the defect causing the wear was not corrected pur-
suant to any of the so-called thirty-day inspections conducted by 
Baileys or Allied. The failure of Defendant Baileys Moving and 
Storage to repair the loose torsion bar causing the tire wear 
continued even after it had been made aware that the suspension 
system needed major repairs by the inspection and estimate of the 
repair made at Utility Trailer. Instead of authorizing the 
repairs, Plaintiff was instructed to have a makeshift repair 
made--a repair described by Appellants1 own witness as a nroad 
repair11 that would do only to get you where you were going so 
i 
that a proper repair could be made. (Abst. 55; Tr. 349) Plaintiff 
asserts, therefore, that the tires demonstrated the fact that 
the suspension system had needed major repair for some time. 
i 
i 
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POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE GENERAL DAMAGES AWARDED WHICH 
EXCEEDED THE AMOUNT PRAYED FOR IN THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE OF THE 
COMPLAINT 
Prior to the trial, Plaintiff's counsel moved to amend the 
Complaint to increase the prayer for general damages from $200,000.00 
to $300,000.00. This Motion was denied. After the jury returned 
a verdict in the sum of $250,000.00 general damages, Plaintiff 
renewed his Motion to Amend; this Motion was likewise denied. 
The trial court retained jurisdiction, however, of the matter 
until such time as it could determine whether Plaintiff was never-
theless entitled to the amount awarded by the jury pursuant to 
Rule 54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Tr. 1007) Upon 
receiving memoranda of points and authorities and hearing arguments 
of counsel (R. 1070) , the trial court ruled that Plaintiff was 
entitled the $250,000.00 general damages found by the jury. 
Rule 54(c)(1) provides as follows: 
(1) Generally, except as to a party against whom a 
judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall 
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is 
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded 
such relief in his pleadings. 
As stated in the Compiler's Note to the Utah Code, this rule 
is similar to Federal Rule 54(c); the primary difference being 
that the state rule is divided into two sub-paragraphs. 
The federal courts are uniform in holding that a verdict is 
not limited by the ad damnum clause and that the prayer is 
irrelevant except in the case of a default judgment. 6 Moore's 
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Fed. Prac., p.1261, n.4 In fact the very authority relied upon 
by Appellants to support their position states: 
The prayer does not limit the amount of recoverable 
damages, whether the action is tried to the court or to 
the jury. 6 Moore's Fed. Prac, pp. 1267-68. 
In support of their position that Respondent's recovery is 
limited by his prayer, Appellants cite state court decisions of 
Kentucky and Wyoming. (App.s Brief at 27-29) These cases were 
decided prior to the dates that those states respectively adopted 
the federal rules. Kentucky adopted the federal rules in July of 
1953,--years after the case relied upon by Appellants was decided. 
Ky. R. Civ. P., page 189. The law in Wyoming, since adoption of 
the federal rules in 1957, no longer supports Appellants1 position. 
After Rule 54(c) was adopted the Wyoming Supreme Court stated: 
11
. . . it is a general rule that the prayer forms no part of 
the statement of a cause of action and is generally unim-
portant. State v. Moore, 356 P.2d 141, 143 (Wyo. 1960) 
i 
This position was reaffirmed in 1972. 
. . . The final judgment should grant all the relief to 
which the Plaintiff is entitled whether or not it has been 
demanded in the pleadings. Walton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 
501 P.2d 802, 806 (1972) i 
Appellants also rely on Oklahoma and Washington cases, but 
because no rule similar to Rule 54(c) has as yet been adopted in 
those states, these decisions are of no value in assisting this ' 
Court in interpreting UtahTs Rule 54(c). 
Appellants rely primarily on the Arizona case of Smith v. 
Tang, 412 P. 2d 697 (Ariz. 1966). In Smith v. Tang, plaintiff * 
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sought, by her first cause of action, to recover $6,078.36 from 
the defendant administrator which included expenses of the 
decedent's last illness, funeral expenses, payments made to 
protect the estate, a loan allegedly made to the decedent and 
one-half of the amount received from the sale of joint tenancy 
property. By her second cause of action, plaintiff demanded 
$14,788.15 for monies spent by her for which she sought reim-
bursement and further loans made to the decedent. Both causes o 
action included a demand for repayment of loans in the amount of 
$4,195.51, which plaintiff was admittedly only entitled to re-
cover once. The jury awarded plaintiff $16,000.00 on the first 
cause of action and $1,900.00 on the second. Defendant's Motion 
for new trial was granted by the trial court. The Arizona court 
reversed the trial court's order but limited recovery to the 
amount of the prayer. This case is not useful precedent for the 
instant case. 
In Smith v. Tang, the damages were liquidated and could be 
determined with some certainty. Thus, the court's ruling is 
within the rule that a jury's award in excess of the prayer will 
not stand, if the damages are a liquidated amount. Dupona v. 
Benny, 291 A.2d 404 (Vt. 1972). Justice Udall, writing for the 
court, did not discuss Paile 54(c) but given the facts of the 
case, the jury obviously erred in awarding the amount that it 
did. The decision, therefore, is not contrary to the provisions 
of Rule 54(c) which provides that "every final judgment shall 
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grant the relief to which [the prevailing party] is entitled . . ." 
In addition, the Arizona Supreme Court has had occasion to 
clearly state that the proposition for which Appellants cite 
Smith v. Tang is not the law of Arizona. In Bechtel v. Benson, 
94 Ariz. 350, 335 P.2d 225 (1963) Justice Udall again writing for 
the Arizona Supreme Court stated: 
Pursuant to this section [equivalent to Utah Rule 54(c) 
"The prayer does not limit the amount of recoverable 
damages, whether the action is tried to the court or to 
the jury." 6 Moore's Fed. Prac. 2d ed. 1953, §54.62 p. 
1209; 3 Barron and Holtzoff Federal Practice and Proce-
dure—Wright revision 1958--Ch. 11, §1194 p.38; and see 
Wendy v. McClean Trucking Co., (C.A.2d 1960) 279 F. 2d 
953. Plaintiff refers us to our decision in Layton v. 
Rocha, 90 Ariz. 369, 363 P.2d 444, where we disapproved 
the giving of an instruction to the effect that the jury 
was permitted to find an amount in accordance with the 
evidence whether more or less than the amount requested 
in the complaint. Our reason for disapproving that in-
struction was that it was a comment on the evidence and 
gave undue emphasis by the court to the amount of damages. 
See e. g. Wendy v. McClean Trucking Co., supra. We did 
not hold that a jury (or a court) would be without justi-
fication in awarding damages in an amount greater than 
that prayed for if such an amount was warranted by the 
evidence'. 335 P.2d at 225-226. (emphasis added) 
Like Arizona, states who have adopted a rule similar to 
Utah!s Rule 54(c) uniformly hold that the amount of the recovery 
is not limited to the amount prayed for in the complaint. Anderson 
v. Cummings, 81 Idaho 327, 340 P.2d 1111 (1959); Bowers v. Spinaio, 
421 S.W.2d 790 (Mr. App. 1967); Wallace v. Nelson, 179 N.W.2d 698 
(Minn. 1970); Jones v. Spindel, 177 S.E.2d 137, 122 Ga. App. 390 
(1970); Johnson v. Dix, Inc. v. Springfield Fuels, Inc. 303 A.2d 
151 (Vt. 1973); Myers v. Smith, 208 N.W.2d 919 (Iowa 1973); 
Johnson v. Basic, 306 N.E.2d 610 (111., App. 1973); Midwest Supply, 
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Inc. v. Waters, 510 P. 2d 876 (Nev. 1973); Gibeault v. City of 
Highland Park, 217 N.W.2d 99 (1974); Ravenis v. Detroit Gen. 
Hosp., 234 N.W.2d 411, 63 Mich. App. 79 (1975). 
Although Plaintiff is not aware of a Utah Supreme Court case 
dealing directly with the question of a jury award in excess of 
the prayer in a personal injury case, the Utah Court's inter-
pretation of Rule 54(c) is consistent with that of other courts 
to the effect that relief is not limited by the prayer for relief. 
In 1958 in the case of Prudential Federal Savings v. Hartford 
Acc't and Idem. Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 P.2d 899 (1958), for 
example, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the Rule 54(c)(1) and 
its effect stating: 
Our new Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted to inject 
liberality into procedure. Rule 54(c)(1) provides: 
lfl
 * * * every final judgment shall grant the relief to 
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings * * *' 
Hartfordfs pleadings did give notice that it deemed the 
assignment a breach of contract which obviated its liability 
and the question of Felt's assignment to Wright-Wirthlin was 
fully canvassed. All it was entitled to was notice of the 
issues being tried and an opportunity to meet them. There 
is nothing to indicate that Felt was in any way misled or 
prevented from presenting all of the facts concerning the 
question as to whether it was the real party in interest on 
this claim." 7 Utah 2d at 377 (emphasis added) 
What is required, therefore, is notice of the issues and an 
opportunity to meet them. In this case Appellants do not allege 
that the issues would be any different if the general damages 
were reduced by twenty percent, nor do they contend that they 
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were in any way prevented from presenting all of the facts con-
cerning the issues at trial. 
Since the Prudential Federal Savings case, the Utah Supreme 
Court has had other occasions to examine and interpret Rule 54(c). 
In 1963, for example, the Utah Supreme Court held in Cheney v. 
Eucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 331 P.2d 86 (1963): 
Pvule 15(b), U.R.C.P. . . . further allows for an amendment 
to conform to the proof after trial even after judgment, 
and indicates that if the ends of justice so require, 
'failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial 
of these issues.1 This idea is confirmed by Rule 54(c)(1), 
U.R.C.P.: [Every] final judgment shall grant the relief to 
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings.1 14 Utah 2d at 211. 
In sustaining an award of attorneys fees that were not prayed 
for in plaintiff's complaint, the Utah Supreme Court gave further 
explanation of the effect of Rule 54(c)(1) in 1969: 
The argument as to attorney's fees is that because they were 
not asked for in plaintiff's complaint they should not have 
been granted. The action was commenced as a suit for damages 
and attorney's fees could not have been asked for properly 
in the original complaint. However, by its counterclaim for 
foreclosure of a mechanic's lien, the defendant converted 
the action into a controversy over the enforcement of a 
lien. Sec. 38-1-13, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 'In any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful 
party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's 
fee, to be fixed by the court, which will be taxed as costs 
in the action.' 
It will be noted that the statute confers the benefit not 
only on the one who asserts the lien but upon 'the successful 
party'; in this instance the plaintiff, who defended against 
the lien. The fact that there was no specific pleading in 
that regard does not preclude such an award. It is indeed 
important that the issue be raised and that the parties have 
full opportunity to meet it. But when that is done, our 
rules indicate that there shall be liberality of procedure 
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to reach the result which justice requires. Rule 1(a), 
U.R.C.P., provides that they shall be 'liberally construed1 
to secure a just * * * determination of every action1 and 
Rule 54(c)(1) provides "* * * every final judgment shall 
grant the relief to which the party * * * is entitled, even 
if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.f ff 
Palombi v. D. C. Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 300-301, 452 P. 2d 
325 (1969) (emphasis added) 
That the Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure intended this 
interpretation has been stated by Committee member and Utah 
Supreme Court Justice Lester A. Wade. Shortly after adoption of 
the rules, Justice Wade wrote an article discussing the new rules 
of procedure and in doing so commented on the effect of Paile 
54(c). 
It is sometimes said that under the [old] code the relief 
granted must follow the prayer and be supported by the facts 
alleged regardless of what the evidence shows. Is that the 
case under the new rules? 
Rule 54(c)(2) requires that a judgment by default ffshall not 
be different in kind from, nor exceed in amount, that 
specifically prayed for." 
«.U .JU «JL /\ /\ /\ 
Under (c)(1) it is provided that except in default cases, 
!every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party . . . is entitled even if the party has not demanded 
such relief.f This contemplates that regardless of the 
relief prayed for or the theory of the pleadings or what the 
party believes himself entitled to, the judgment must award 
whatever relief the evidence shows that the party is entitled 
to. It is doubtful that this could be done under the code 
without amending the pleadings to conform to the proof, but 
such amendment could be made even after judgment.M Hon. 
Lester A. Wade, "Some of the Purposes and Effects of the New 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure," 2 Utah L. Rev. 12, 26 (1952) 
(emphasis added) 
In view of Appellants1 public policy arguments for limiting 
plaintiff!s recovery to the prayer of the Complaint, it should be 
noted that during the last legislative session the Utah Legislature 
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prohibited plaintiffs from stating a dollar amount in the 
ad damnum clause of medical malpractice complaints. Utah Code 
Ann. §78-14-7 (1976 Supp.) 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF WAS ERRONEOUSLY DENIED THE BENEFIT OF PRIMA 
FACIE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANTS1 NEGLIGENCE BECAUSE DEFENDANTS 
FAILED TO SECURE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. 
The trial court refused to give Plaintiff's Requested 
Instruction No. 16-A which would have placed the burden of proof 
on Baileys to show freedom from negligence pursuant to Section 
35-1-57 of the Utah Code. (R. 924) Although it has been held 
that failure to provide coverage does not constitute a separate 
cause of action, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend his Complaint in 
order to include this allegation was denied February 8, 1974. (R. 
729, 734, 779) See Shepard v. Chrysler Corp., 430 F.2d 161 (5th 
Cir. 1970) 
In the instant case Plaintiff had purchased a tractor on 
time from C 6c J Bailey and leased it back to Baileys. (Abst. 28; 
Plfs. Exh. 28) He had also entered into an agreement whereby 
Bailey1s Moving and Storage furnished the trailer. The trailer 
was to be used by Plaintiff in the transportation of household 
goods "as directed by Baileys." (Plfs. Exh. 29) He was required 
to call Allied Ban Lines each day to receive orders. (Tr. 463) 
He was required to call Baileys each time he unloaded and each 
time he received orders from the Allied Van Lines dispatcher. 
(Plfs. Exh. 29) Baileys furnished all licenses and permits. 
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(Plfs. Exh. 29) If a second driver was to go with Plaintiff 
Bailey permission was required. (Plfs. Exh . 29) The Defendants 
were also concerned about other factors such as whether he re-
ceived a traffic citation. (Defs. Exh. 34) Baileys also had the 
ability to terminate him. 
Q. (By Mr. Wadsworth) Now, at some time subsequent to the 
accident did you have a conversation with Mr. Dewsnup wherein 
he was terminated as an employee of Bailey1s and of Allied 
Van Lines? 
A. Yes, I did. (Tr. 478) (See also Defs. Exh. 34) 
Based upon the above undisputed facts, Plaintiff was an 
employee entitled to workmenfs compensation coverage. See Moser 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 51, 440 P.2d 23 (1968); Knoble 
v. National Carriers, Inc., 212 P.2d 1274 (Kan. 1973) Nevertheless, 
Baileys considered Plaintiff an independent contractor and failed 
to secure workmen!s compensation on his behalf. 
Because the burden of proof should have been on the Defendants 
to establish the lack of negligence on their part, their charge 
that the judgment should not stand is without merit. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment should be affirmed because it cannot be shown 
that Defendants did not receive a fair trial. 
Defendants1 first contention that they did not receive a 
fair trial is based upon their contentions that the evidence is 
not sufficient to sustain the verdict. This contention must fai 
First, even without relying upon any of the expert testimony 
challenged by Defendants, the jury could have arrived at its 
verdict simply by drawing reasonable inferences from the 
unchallenged evidence. Second, the testimony of the expert 
witness was unequivocal that the wreck was caused by ground 
induced steering. With regard to the foregoing, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated in a case involving a similar 
fact situation: 
No strain on the deductive process is required to conclude 
that the failure of the bolts caused the truck to leave the 
highway, turn around and finally overturn. This is not 
only supported by the circumstances; the expert witness 
Halley gave a positive opinion that this occurred. White 
Motor Corp. v. Stewart, 465 F.2d 1035, 1088 (1972). 
Finally, Plaintiff was entitled to a ruling based upon a prima 
facie case of negligence because of Baileys1 failure to comply 
with the workmen1s compensation statute. 
Defendants have shown neither error nor prejudice as a 
result of the trial courtfs admission of the evidence they 
challenge. No prejudice or unfairness to Defendants has been 
demonstrated by entry of judgment in accordance with the jury's 
award to the extent it exceeds the prayer of the Complaint. On 
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the other hand, Rule 54(c) mandates that the prevailing party 
should be awarded the relief to which it is entitled. 
Defendants have not shown that they did not receive a fair 
trial. The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HENRIOD & 
GOTTFREDSON 
Earl Jc 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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APPENDIX 'A1 
(The diagram below is that shown on 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 13 and 18) 
Frame of trailer 
Frame Bracket (Exhibit 20-D) (See Plaintiff's Exhibits 13 
and 18 for location of break as described by police officer 
and shop foreman, Lee Wareham, respectively.) 
( 
Torsion Bar (Exhibit 17E-P) 
Equalizer beam (Exhibit 17C-P) (Exhibit 17D-P not shown) 
Axle 
i 
'U' Bolts 
Air bags (Exhibit 17C-P) 
Bushing (not shown) (Exhibit 17G-P) 
Positioning bolt (not shown) (Exhibit 17F-P) 
i 
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